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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FEDERAL INDIAN LAW:
THE EROSION OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AS THE
PROTECTION OF THE NONINTERCOURSE ACT CONTINUES
TO BE REDEFINED MORE NARROWLY
Cass County Joint Water Resource District v. 1.43 Acres of Land,
2002 ND 83,643 N.W.2d 685
I. FACTS
In 1994, Cass County Joint Water Resource District (District) sub-
mitted an application to the United States Army Corps of Engineers
(USACE) to build a dam on the Maple River for flood control in eastern
North Dakota.' As part of this project, the District sought to acquire a 1.43-
acre tract of land in order to conduct the cultural research necessary to
obtain the USACE permit because that piece of land would be subject to
frequent and prolonged flooding if the dam was constructed. 2
The 1.43-acre tract was part of the area obtained by the federal govern-
ment from the Mdewakanton and Wahpakoota Bands of Indians in 1851,
along with the Sisseton and Wahpeton Bands of Santee Sioux Indians in
1867, 1872, and 1873.3 Near the end of the 19th century, the land was
transferred by patent to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company. 4 For al-
most one hundred years, the land was privately owned.5 It had not been
plowed or planted in the ninety-nine years the Shea family owned it.6
The Great Plains Regional Tribal Chairman's Association 7 passed a
resolution opposing construction of the dam, concerned that the proposed
1. Cass County Joint Water Res. Dist. v. 1.43 Acres of Land, 2002 ND 83, 2, 643 N.W.2d
685.
2. Brief of Appellant at 2, Cass County Joint Water Res. Dist. v. 1.43 Acres of Land, 2002
ND 83,643 N.W.2d 685 (No. 2001-0217).
3. Id. at 3.
4. 1.43 Acres of Land, 5 3, 643 N.W.2d at 688.
5. Brief of Appellees at 4, Cass County Joint Water Res. Dist. v. 1.43 Acres of Land, 2002
ND 83,643 N.W.2d 685 (No. 2001-0217).
6. Id.
7. The Great Plains Tribal Chairman's Association (GPTCA) is composed of the elected
chairs and presidents representing seventeen federally recognized tribes within the Great Plains
region of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. 66 Fed. Reg. 22255 (May 3, 2001). GPTCA was formed
to promote the common interests of the sovereign Tribes and Nations and their members of the
Great Plains Region. See also DLN Issues: Native Child and Family Rights, DAKOTA-LAKOTA-
NAKOTA HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY COALITION at http://www.dlncoalition.org/dln-issues/
2003_icwaresolution.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2004);
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flooding area is filled with burial mounds as well as individual unmarked
graves of ancestors associated with the Turtle Mountain Band of Ojibwa,
the Spirit Lake Sioux Tribe, and the Three Affiliated Tribes.8 Because of
the dispute over whether the site for the Maple River Dam Project con-
tained burial mounds, and might be subject to the National Historic
Preservation Act (NHPA)9 requirements, an Environmental Impact Study0
(EIS) was done."I After completion of the EIS, the Turtle Mountain Band
of Chippewa Indians (Tribe) submitted comments on the Draft Environ-
mental Impact Statement (DEIS), expressing concern about the status of
identified cultural sites and the high probability of additional sites near that
location. 12
On July 28, 2000, Roger Shea conveyed the 1.43-acre tract of land to
the Tribe by executing a warranty deed for $500, but reserved the right to
graze his livestock on the land.13 The deed was properly recorded.14 On
February 6, 2001, Shea also conveyed his right to graze livestock by
executing a quitclaim deed for $1, but this deed was never recorded.15
The Tribe is a federally-recognized Indian tribe with a 43,000-acre
reservation in Rolette County, 200 miles from the 1.43-acre tract at issue. 16
The Tribe and individual members acquired additional land over time. 17
Resolution of the Great Plains Regional Tribal Chairman's Association at
http://www.wintercount.org/people/unsupport.txt (last visited Mar. 19, 2004).
8. Appellees' Brief at 4, 1.43 Acres of Land (No. 2001-0217).
9. National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), 16 U.S.C. § 470 (2000). Under the Act,
federal agencies are required to administer cultural properties in a way that preserves, restores, or
maintains objects of historical, architectural, or archaeological significance. Id. NHPA requires
federal agencies to take reasonable steps to identify the area of potential effect, to identify any
properties within that area that may be eligible for the National Register of Historic Places, to
determine whether there will be any adverse effects, and to outline a plan to mitigate any adverse
effects. Id.
10. National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1994). NHPA is an
extension of NEPA, the act requiring all federal agencies to examine the environmental impact of
any action that would significantly affect the quality of the human environment. Id. An environ-
mental impact statement (EIS) must be prepared, offering a detailed statement describing the
environmental impact of the proposed action, including adverse environmental effects which
cannot be avoided; possible alternatives to the proposed action; the relationship between local
short-term uses and long-term productivity; and irreversible and irretrievable commitments of
resources if the proposed action were implemented. Id. § 4332(c). Copies are to be made avail-
able to the public. Id.
11. Appellees' Brief at 3, 1.43 Acres of Land (No. 2001-0217).
12. Id.





17. Brief of Appellees at 2, Cass County Joint Water Res. Dist. v. 1.43 Acres of Land, 2002
ND 83, 643 N.W.2d 685 (No. 2001-0217).
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Today, the Tribe and its members hold over 77,000 acres of land on and
immediately adjacent to its reservation in Rolette County.' 8 In addition,
they hold almost 7,000 acres in trust around Trenton, North Dakota, 83,000
acres of land in Montana, and ten acres at the Pembina cemetery site where
their ancestors are buried.19 Although the 1.43-acre tract of land does not
lie within the aboriginal homelands of the Tribe, the Tribe contended that
its ancestors once occupied the area and that the tract contained a culturally
significant village and burial site.20 The land is not allotted land, nor is it
held in trust by the federal government. 21 After the commencement of this
lawsuit, the Tribe applied to the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs and
requested that the federal government take this 1.43-acre tract of land into
trust.
22
The District offered the Tribe $300 for the tract of land.23 When the
Tribe refused to sell the land, the District brought an action seeking con-
demnation of the 1.43-acre tract. 24 The Tribe responded with a motion to
dismiss, arguing the district court did not have jurisdiction because of
Tribal sovereign immunity, preemption by the Federal Nonintercourse Act,
lack of a state statutory basis for the condemnation, and the inability to
condemn a cemetery. 25 Mr. Shea was also named a defendant.26 He moved
to dismiss the action by claiming he no longer had an interest in the
property. 27
The Court of the East Central Judicial District of North Dakota granted
the Tribe's motion to dismiss. 28 It held that both in rem jurisdiction over
the land and in personam jurisdiction over the Tribe were required to
entertain a condemnation action. 29 The court concluded that it lacked juris-
diction to hear the condemnation action because tribal sovereign immunity
barred its assertion of jurisdiction over the Tribe. 30 The district court also
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Cass County Joint Water Res. Dist. v. 1.43 Acres of Land, 2002 ND 83, 5 4, 643 N.W.2d
685,688.
21. Id.
22. Appellant's Brief at 3, 1.43 Acres of Land (No. 2001-0217).
23. Appellees' Brief at 3, 1.43 Acres of Land (No. 2001-0217).
24. 1.43 Acres of Land, T 5, 643 N.W.2d at 688.
25. Appellant's Brief at 4, 1.43 Acres of Land (No. 20010217). The Indian Trade and
Intercourse Act (Nonintercourse Act) was first passed in 1790 and provided that no purchase,
grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands from any Indian nation or tribe shall be of any validity
in law or equity, unless it is made by treaty. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2000).
26. 1.43 Acres of Land, 5 5, 643 N.W.2d at 688.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. 5 6.
30. Id.
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granted Shea's motion to dismiss, holding that he had no interest in the
property. 31
The District appealed both Judgments of Dismissal, which resulted in
this case going before the North Dakota Supreme Court.32 The District ar-
gued that in rem proceedings do not require the court to have personal juris-
diction over the Tribe.33 The District claimed that jurisdiction over the land
was sufficient in a condemnation action and sovereign immunity did not
apply. 34 The District argued that because the quitclaim deed had not been
recorded, Shea was a record owner at the time of the condemnation action
and he should remain in the lawsuit in order for the District to obtain clear
title.35
The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the district court, holding
that because the District was acting on behalf of the State, it had broad
authority to acquire property for public use.36 A condemnation action is
purely in rem, and does not require personal jurisdiction over the Tribe;
therefore, the district court could validly exercise jurisdiction because the
Tribe's sovereign immunity was not implicated. 37 The court held that the
Nonintercourse Act did not apply after the federal government had already
removed the restraints on alienation of the land. 38
The North Dakota Supreme Court also reversed the dismissal of the
action naming Shea as a defendant. 39 It reasoned that the inclusion of all
record title holders in condemnation judgments gave assurance to the con-
demnor that it would receive clear title free from future disputes.a0 The
court noted that Shea could not be subject to any personal liability since the
action was strictly an in rem proceeding, and a judgment would have no
effect on his interests. 41
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In order to address the issue of the State's power of eminent domain
over lands owned by the Tribe, this comment will: (1) explore and define
the authority of the state with respect to eminent domain and jurisdiction,
31. Id. 5 5.
32. Id.
33. Id. J 7.
34. Id.
35. Id. 34, 643 N.W.2d at 698.
36. Id. 20, 643 N.W.2d at 694.
37. Id. 520, 21.
38. Id. 5 33, 643 N.W.2d at 698.
39. Id. 5 38, 643 N.W.2d at 699.
40. Id. 37.
41. Id. at 698-99.
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and (2) provide a background detailing the unique status of tribes in this
country, and how that status affects the authority of states with respect to
the tribes.
A. STATE'S POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
Eminent domain is the power of a sovereign to take private property for
public use without obtaining the owner's consent, as long as just compen-
sation is made.42 This authority springs from the necessity of government,
and it is an essential attribute of sovereignty. 43 The authority is based on
the superior right of the state over private property.4 The North Dakota
Supreme Court has ruled that the right of eminent domain does not depend
upon a constitutional grant or recognition because it is an inherent attribute
of sovereignty.4 5 The taking of private property for public use is often
necessary for the proper performance of governmental functions.46 This
power is essential to the life of a state and cannot be surrendered. 47 "[I]f
attempted to be contracted away, it may always be resumed at will." 48 The
power of eminent domain extends to all property within the jurisdiction of
the state.49 However, the power has limitations: one of the fundamental
principles in the law of eminent domain is that private property may not be
condemned unless it is for a recognized public use.50 In Square Butte
Electric Cooperative v. Hilken,51 the North Dakota Supreme Court outlined
the elements that must be present in order for a public use to exist. 52 First,
the public must receive an actual benefit produced from the regulatory
42. IA-3 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, Source of Power in Sovereign, § 3.01 (Julius L.
Sackman ed., rev. 3d ed. 2003).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See Johnson v. Wells County Water Res. Bd., 410 N.W.2d 525, 527 (N.D. 1987) (ruling
a quick take eminent domain provision in the North Dakota Constitution was not self-executing
and the Water Board did not have the power to acquire flowage easements without a legislative
grant of authority).
46. See Georgia v. Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472, 480 (1924) (holding Tennessee had power of




50. Square Butte Elec. Coop. v. Hilken, 244 N.W.2d 519, 524 (N.D. 1976). An electric
cooperative appealed a denial of its right to exercise eminent domain for failure to establish a
public use. Id. at 520. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, holding the lower court erred
in finding that a public use had not been established. Id. at 541. The dissent stated that grants of
power by the government should be strictly construed, especially with respect to the power of
eminent domain, because it is more harsh and peremptory than any other. Id. at 534 (Sand, J.,
dissenting).
51. 244 N.W.2d 519 (N.D. 1976).
52. Square Butte, 244 N.W.2d at 525.
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control or a right to that benefit. 53 Second, the benefit must be something
greater than an indirect advantage; the public must derive a substantial and
direct benefit.54 Third, the public benefit need not be confined exclusively
to the state authorizing the condemnation, but due to the constraints of the
state's sovereignty it must be inextricably attached to the territorial limits of
the state.55
North Dakota's eminent domain statutes are found in Title 32, Chapter
15, of the North Dakota Century Code. 56 Section 32-15-18 lists the
elements that must be contained in the complaint.57 Section 32-15-20 ad-
dresses who may defend against a condemnation action.58 Section 32-15-04
enumerates what property may be taken.59 At the time this case was de-
cided, Indian land was not addressed anywhere in the entire chapter.
60
B. JURISDICTION
If a court's jurisdiction is based on its authority over the defendant, it is
defined as in personam jurisdiction.6' When the court exercises in
personam jurisdiction, it has the power to impose a personal obligation on
the defendant. 62 If a court's jurisdiction is based on its power over property
within its territory, it is exercising in rem jurisdiction.63 A judgment in rem
would be limited to the property, and would not impose a personal liability




56. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-15-01 through 32-15-35 (1996 & Supp. 2003).
57. Id. § 32-15-18. The complaint must contain the name of the plaintiff in charge of the
public use for which the property is sought, the names of all known owners and claimants of the
property styled as defendants, a statement of plaintiff's rights, and a description of the land sought
to be taken. Id.
58. Id. § 32-15-20. All persons claiming an interest in the property may appear, plead, and
defend their interest, whether or not they are named in the complaint. Id.
59. Id. § 32-15-04. Six different classes of property are listed, including a broad range of
both private and public property. Id. There is a final clause stating that all classes of private pro-
perty not previously enumerated may be taken for public use when the taking is authorized by law.
Id. § 32-15-04(7).
60. Id. §§ 32-15-01 to 32-15-32. However, § 32-15-01, Eminent Domain Defined, and § 32-
15-04, What Property May Be Taken, were both amended during the 2003 legislative session to
include sections addressing Native American lands. Id. In the annotations, both sections refer to
Cass County Joint Water Res. Dist. v. 1.43 Acres of Land, 2002 N.D. 83, 643 N.W.2d 685. Id.






It has long been settled that condemnation proceedings are in rem
proceedings. 65 The Oregon Supreme Court noted that even though a con-
demnation proceeding was against named individuals who held the title, it
was still a proceeding in rem.66 In the field of eminent domain, few
principles of law are more firmly established than the rule that the court
exercises a special statutory jurisdiction.67 A condemnation judgment in
rem preempts even state statutory requirements.68
The fact that an action involves real property is not always deter-
minative of whether in personam or in rem jurisdiction is required. 69
However, the general rule is that in rem jurisdiction is required when the
decision will directly affect real property.70 A decision in rem operates di-
rectly on the property in question, whether or not the owner is subject to in
personam jurisdiction of the court.7' A proceeding in rem is against the
property directly and is binding on everyone, even in the absence of
personal notice to interested parties or jurisdiction over their persons.72
The North Dakota Supreme Court has held that in rem jurisdiction was
sufficient for dissolution of a marriage as well as a child custody action.73
In Smith v. Smith,74 the court exerted in rem jurisdiction even though one of
the parties was from Pennsylvania. 75 An in rem action is brought against
65. See United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 376 (1946) (holding a condemnation
action by the government to acquire an apartment building was strictly an in rem proceeding); see
also Farley v. State, 350 S.E.2d 263, 264 (Ga. App. 1986) (ruling a condemnation forfeiture was
an in rem proceeding and jurisdiction was only required over the property); Utilities, Inc. of
Maryland v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 763 A.2d 129, 135 (Md. App. 2000)
(holding a condemnation action brought by the Commission against a privately owned water and
sewage system was strictly a judgment in rem); McKenzie County v. Hodel, 467 N.W.2d 701, 705
(N.D. 1991) (determining that a condemnation proceeding against an oil and gas royalty interest
was an in rem proceeding); In re Seattle, 353 P.2d 955, 957 (Wash. 1960) (holding a
condemnation action against private property for purpose of building a public park was a
proceeding in rem).
66. See State Highway Comm'n v. Clark, 395 P.2d 146, 148 (Or. 1964) (reversing an award
of attorney's fees in an action to condemn 3.4 acres of land for highway purposes).
67. Utilities, Inc., 763 A.2d at 134.
68. Id.
69. 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 80 (1995 & Supp. 2002).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. 1 AM. JUR. 2DActions § 34 (1994).
73. Catlin v. Catlin, 494 N.W.2d 581, 589 (N.D. 1992). "[Dlissolution of marriage is an in
rem proceeding affecting status, and the court need not have personal jurisdiction over both
spouses." Id. at 588. Although the court also had personal jurisdiction by the long-arm statute in
this situation, it noted that child custody actions were proceedings in rem affecting status, and
personal jurisdiction was not required. Id. at 590.
74. 459 N.W.2d 785 (N.D. 1990).
75. Smith, 459 N.W.2d at 787-88. The court held that dissolution of marriage was an in rem
proceeding and personal jurisdiction was not required over both parties. Id. at 787. If due process
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 80:205
the property alone; the property itself is the defendant. 76 The only reason
the owner is given service of process is to give him notice and the oppor-
tunity to be heard regarding the disposition of his property.
77
States' power to exert in rem jurisdiction has not gone unchecked,
however. 78 In Shaffer v. Heitner,79 the United States Supreme Court de-
clared that the presence of property in a state does not automatically confer
jurisdiction.80 The Court acknowledged that assertion of in rem jurisdiction
is ancient and has no substantial modem justification.8' It declared it was
fictional to assume that jurisdiction over property was anything but
jurisdiction over the owner of that property.82 The Court concluded that
continued acceptance of this practice would be fundamentally unfair to
defendants and required that all future assertions of state court jurisdiction
be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe Co.
v. Washington.83
In International Shoe, the United States Supreme Court outlined the
"minimum contacts" doctrine. 84 To subject a defendant to a judgment in
personam, due process requires that the defendant who is not present must
have minimum contacts with the forum state, so maintenance of the suit
does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
85
The question of whether due process is satisfied depends upon the
relationship between the quality and nature of the activity, and the fair and
orderly administration of the laws.86 Although Shaffer was concemed with
in rem jurisdiction, and International Shoe involved in personam
was proper, the court had jurisdiction to terminate the marital status of the parties even when only
one party was a North Dakota resident. Id. at 788.
76. See Phillips v. Chas. Schreiner Bank, 894 F.2d 127, 132 (5th Cir. 1990) (granting an
appeal from an order forbidding a foreclosure action).
77. See United States v. Dunnington, 146 U.S. 338, 352 (1892) (ruling a proceeding in rem
was a taking of the property itself, with only a general notice to all persons having claims to it);
see also Farley v. State, 350 S.E.2d 263, 264 (Ga. App. 1986) (holding a condemnation forfeiture
was an in rem proceeding requiring only that a copy of the action be served on the owner, if
known); United States v. Winn, 83 F. Supp. 172, 174 (W.D.S.D. 1949) (holding notice by publica-
tion was sufficient even though defendant claimed he was not served and was unaware of the
condemnation of his land for a park); In re Seattle, 353 P.2d 955, 958 (Wash. 1960) (determining
that the only reason to join a defendant as a party was to give notice and enable him to have a
hearing).
78. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211-12 (1977).
79. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
80. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 211-12.
81. Id. at 212.
82. Id.
83. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
84. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
85. Id.
86. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977) (quoting Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319).
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judgments, the Court in Shaffer held that the minimum contacts doctrine
should be applied to in rem proceedings as well.8 7
In Shaffer, the Court declared a Delaware statute unconstitutional
because it allowed a Delaware state court to sequester shares of the
defendants' stock in a company that was incorporated in Delaware, yet the
corporation's principal place of business was in Arizona. 88 None of the
defendants were residents of Delaware. 89 The Court held that the seques-
tration statute, as applied, violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because it authorized the deprivation of defendants' property
without providing adequate procedural safeguards.90
C. FEDERAL INDIAN LAW POLICIES
United States Indian policy has always developed out of tension
between two competing forces, autonomy and assimilation. 91 The laws are
numerous and conflicting, reflecting the tone during the eras in which they
were enacted.92
By the 1830's, the United States had determined a set of principles that
became the standards for the development of American Indian policy. 93
Some of the basic elements of the federal program were: (1) protection of
Indian land rights by restricting whites from entering the area, (2) control of
the disposition of Indian lands by denying the right of non-Indians to
acquire Indian land, and (3) promotion of Indian civilization and education
in the hopes of assimilation into American society.94
1. Tribal Sovereign Immunity
The sovereign status of Indian tribes has been recognized since the
early 1800's when the United States Supreme Court proclaimed that tribes
retain powers of self-government within Indian country. 95 Chief Justice
Marshall recognized the Doctrine of Tribal Sovereign Immunity in three
87. Id. at 212.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 191.
90. Id. at 212, 216; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
91. Charles F. Wilkinson, American Indians, Time, and the Law, in CASES AND MATERIALS
ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 30-31 (David H. Getches, et al., eds. 4th ed. 1998) [hereinafter
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW].
92. Id.
93. Francis Paul Prucha, American Indian Policy in the Formative Years: The Indian Trade
and Intercourse Acts, 1790-1834, in FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 91, at 87-88.
94. Id. at 88.
95. FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 91, at 3
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decisions regarding the Cherokee Indians, known as the Marshall Trilogy.96
The Trilogy is generally acknowledged to be the most important group of
cases in the history of Federal Indian law and has served as the legal
foundation for most of the Indian law cases decided by courts since.
97
Chief Justice Marshall recognized and upheld a theme of tribal sovereignty,
stating that the Cherokee nation was a sovereign nation, authorized to
govern itself, free from interference from the states. 98 In Worcester v.
Georgia,99 the Court held that Georgia had no authority to extend its laws
into Cherokee country, even though Cherokee country was encompassed
within the state. 100 Justice Marshall held that under the United States
Constitution, Congress had the exclusive authority to regulate commerce
and all other intercourse with tribes.10' The Court stated, "The Cherokee
Nation is under the protection of the United States of America, and of no
other sovereign whatsoever."102
The relationship of Indians to the federal government has always been
described as "dependent."1 03 The tribes rely on the United States for pro-
tection through a trust relationship.10 4 As long as the tribes have not vol-
untarily ceded sovereign tribal rights in treaties or other negotiations
approved by Congress, or Congress has not extinguished them, the rights
remain in existence. 105 Any rights that have not been specifically ceded are
considered to be reserved.106 When rights are extinguished, the legislation
is to be construed narrowly, affecting only the matters specifically
mentioned. 107
Since the Trilogy cases, the Supreme Court has classified the tribes as
domestic dependent nations with sovereign powers.108 This sovereign
status has been recognized throughout the course of dealings between the
United States and the Indian tribes; however, the precise nature of that
96. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30
U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) are the cases that
comprise the Marshall Trilogy. George Jackson III, Chicksaw Nation v. United States and the
Potential Demise of the Indian Canon of Construction, 27 AM. IND. L. REV. 399, 402-03 (2002-
2003). These decisions by Justice Marshall are also referred to as the Cherokee cases. Id.
97. Jackson, supra note 96, at 402-03.
98. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 530.
99. Id. at 515.
100. Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 2 (1995).
101. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 540; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
102. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 555.





108. Royster, supra note 100, at 2.
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sovereignty has been indeterminate and subject to historic revision. 109
Tribes are not sovereign in the international sense because they are not
treated as nation-states with the ability to enter into foreign relations.110
They have always been subject to the overarching authority and jurisdiction
of the federal government.Il
Sovereignty is inextricably tied to territory because control over
territory is the most essential element of sovereignty.1 2 The reservation is
the major territory for most tribes.113 However, tribal territories are more
accurately described as "Indian country," which encompasses not only the
reservation, but certain lands outside of the reservation boundaries.'1 14 As
sovereign entities, Indian tribes benefit from immunity to suit in state or
federal court.1 15 It is well settled that waiver of their sovereign immunity
must be unequivocally expressed; it will not be implied."16
The recent trend in federal Indian policy is to move away from the
"outmoded paternalistic practices and policies" of tribal sovereign
immunity." 7 Justice Kennedy stated that Congress may have thought the
doctrine of tribal immunity from suit necessary in the past to protect tribal
governments from encroachments by the states; however, in our inter-
dependent and mobile society, tribal immunity extends beyond what is
needed to safeguard tribal self-governance. 118
There has been a shift in attitude regarding Indian jurisprudence.'1 9
Since 1986, when William Rehnquist became Chief Justice, Indian tribes
have prevailed in only twenty-three percent of their cases, and they lost all
but five of the twenty-eight Indian law matters before the Supreme Court
between 1991 and 2000.120
By the late twentieth century, the Supreme Court was comfortable





113. Id. at 2-3.
114. Id. at 3.
115. Anderson & Middleton Lumber Co. v. Quinault Indian Nation, 929 P.2d 379, 386
(Wash. 1996) (quoting McClendon v. United States, 885 F.2d 627, 629 (9th Cir. 1989)).
116. Id. (citing North Sea Prods. v. Clipper Seafoods Co., 595 P.2d 938, 941 (Wash. 1979)).
117. Penobscot Indian Nation v. Key Bank of Maine, 112 F.3d 538, 554 (lst Cir. 1997).
118. Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 758 (1998). This contract dispute was
dismissed due to Tribe's sovereign immunity. Id. Justice Kennedy implied that it may be time for
Congress to abrogate the doctrine of tribal immunity. Id.
119. Jackson, supra note 96, at 420.
120. Harold S. Shepard, State Court Jurisdiction Over Tribal Water Rights: A Call For
Rational Thinking, 17 J. ENvTL. L. & LITIG. 343, 345 (2002).
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law had no force within reservation boundaries.121 In County of Yakima v.
Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,122 Justice
Scalia declared that the "platonic notions of Indian sovereignty" that guided
Chief Justice Marshall have, over time, lost their independent sway as the
Court's more recent cases have recognized the rights of states. 123 In a more
recent case, Nevada v. Hicks,124 Justice Scalia stated that under our system
of dual sovereignty, it has always been assumed that state courts are com-
petent to adjudicate federal issues. 125 He observed that this historical and
constitutional assumption of concurrent state court jurisdiction over federal
law cases has been completely missing with respect to tribal courts.
126
There have been aggressive actions increasing state jurisdiction,
alarming scholars who compare this trend with the disastrous policies of the
termination era.127 Historically, because of the trust relationship, the federal
government's duty was to protect tribes and their interests from the actions
of state governments. 28 But as federal courts have become much less re-
sponsive to tribal rights claims, state courts have followed this lead.129 Yet
state court opinions often fall short of stringent adherence to principles of
tribal sovereignty and an understanding of the ability of tribes to govern
their land and people.130 State court decisions often involve a conflict of
sovereigns, and an increased federal deference to states in the area of tribal
property rights only exacerbates the conflict.13
Another long-standing Indian law doctrine came under attack in
Chicksaw Nation v. United States,132 where the Supreme Court addressed
the Indian law canon of statutory construction favoring Indians. 33 The
Court diminished the legal importance of the Indian law canon with its
121. Royster, supra note 100, at 4 (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448
U.S. 136, 141 (1980)).
122. 502 U.S. 251 (1992).
123. Yakima, 502 U.S. at 257 (citing McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S.
164, 172 (1973)).
124. 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
125. Shepard, supra note 120, at 365 (citing Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 366-77 (2001)).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 345-46. The termination era refers to the time when the General Allotment Act
was passed, see infra Part H.C.3.
128. Shepard, supra note 120, at 346.
129. Id. at 344.
130. Id. at 360.
131. Id. at 386.
132. 534 U.S. 84 (2001).
133. Graydon Dean Luthey, Jr., Chicksaw Nation v. United States: The Beginning of the End
of the Indian Law Canons in Statutory Cases and the Start of the Judicial Assault on the Trust
Relationship, 27 AM. IND. L. REV. 553, 561 (2002-2003).
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opening observation that canons are not mandatory rules. 134 The Court cast
doubt on the primacy and vitality of the canon of statutory instruction when
it implied its use should be narrowed to interpretation of treaty issues, rather
than issues of statutory ambiguity.135 This shift in policy could leave Indian
tribes without one of the doctrines they have depended on and based their
social and business activities around for two hundred years.' 36
Scholars claim the current trend toward the erosion of tribal sover-
eignty reflects poorly on the federal government's obligation to protect
tribal health and welfare.137 They argue that this erosion of tribal sover-
eignty contributes to the increasing threats to tribal government, economic
development, and cultural and environmental protection.138 Critics contend
that in the economic context, tribal sovereign immunity harms those who
are unaware of the doctrine, or it harms tribes because it lessens their oppor-
tunities for commercial dealings when there is no recourse in the courts for
resolving disputes. 139
2. Nonintercourse Act
The Indian Trade and Intercourse Act (Nonintercourse Act) was first
passed in 1790, yet even with minor changes in 1802 and 1834, it has
remained materially unchanged.140 The Nonintercourse Act provides that
no purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands from any Indian
nation or tribe, shall be of any validity in law or equity, unless it is made by
treaty entered into pursuant to the Constitution.141 When enacting this
legislation, the intent of President George Washington and Congress was to
protect Indians from the greed of other races. 142 The belief at the time was
that only the federal government could ensure Indian lands were settled
peacefully and Indians were treated fairly. 143 The purpose of the provision
was to prevent unfair or improper disposition of Indian lands to other
parties, except the United States, without the consent of Congress.144
134. Id. at 555, 562.
135. Id. at 563-65.
136. Jackson, supra note 96, at 420.
137. Shepard, supra note 120, at 385.
138. Id. at 386.
139. Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Tech., Inc., 523 U.S.751, 758 (1998).
140. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2000); Prucha, supra note 93, at 87.
141. 25 U.S.C. § 177.
142. Lummi Indian Tribe v. Whatcom County, 5 F.3d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir. 1993).
143. Id.
144. Bay Mills Indian Cmty. v. State, 626 N.W.2d 169, 174 (Mich. App. 2001) (citing
Federal Power Comm'n. v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 119 (1960)).
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The United States Supreme Court has never directly addressed the
issue of whether the Nonintercourse Act applied to land that was rendered
alienable by Congress and later reacquired by an Indian tribe.145 Histori-
cally, the Nonintercourse Act was held to apply to Indian land, whether or
not the land was held in trust.14 6 The trust relationship between the Indian
tribes and the United States was honored, even though the lands were held
in fee simple. 147
In United States v. Candelaria,148 the Supreme Court recognized that
Indians had a fee simple title to their lands, but held that their lands, like the
tribal lands of other Indians owned in fee patent, were "subject to the
legislation enacted by Congress in the exercise of the government's guard-
ianship over Indian tribes and their property."149 At that time, when inter-
preting the Nonintercourse Act, the Court construed congressional intent for
the definition of the term "Indian tribe" to mean a body of Indians in-
habiting a particular territory even though that territory was ill-defined.150
In United States v. 7,404.3 Acres of Land in Macon, Swain, and Clay
Counties,151 the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians had surrendered the right
to their tribal lands, separated themselves from their tribe, and become
subject to the laws of the state of North Carolina. 52 Yet the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that this did not destroy the right or the duty of
guardianship on the part of the federal government.153 Even the conferring
of citizenship upon the Indians and allotment of their lands in severalty did
not place them beyond the reach of congressional regulations adopted for
their protection. 154
145. Cass County v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S. 103, 115 (1998).
146. See United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432, 440-44 (1926) (holding that the Non-
intercourse Act applied to the fee lands of the Pueblo Indians); see also United States v. Sandoval,
231 U.S. 28, 45-48 (1913) (finding that Congress could restrict alienation of fee simple lands
owned by the Pueblo Indians); Alonzo v. United States, 249 F.2d 189, 196 (10th Cir. 1957) (hold-
ing that the United States must be named as a party in an action to divest the Tribe of fee land
owned by the Pueblo Nation); United States v. 7,404.3 Acres of Land, 97 F.2d 417, 422 (4th Cir.
1938) (holding that plaintiff could not claim tribal lands by adverse possession even though the
statute provided the grant must be registered within two years, and although the land grant had
been given to the Cherokee Tribe in 1880, it was not registered until after the suit was commenced
in 1936).
147. Candelaria, 271 U.S. at 440-44; Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 45-48; Alonzo, 249 F.2d at 196.
148. 271 U.S. 432 (1926).
149. Candelaria, 271 U.S. at 440.
150. Id. at 442 (quoting Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 266 (1901)) (indicating the
protection of the Nonintercourse Act was afforded to tribes whose land was held in fee patent as
well as trust land).
151. 97 F.2d 417 (4th Cir. 1938).





The First Circuit Court of Appeals observed that several courts have
found the Nonintercourse Act applicable to lands that Indian tribes have
purchased in fee simple. 55 The court reasoned that at the time the
Nonintercourse Act was passed, Congress presumably did not distinguish
between Indian trust lands and Indian fee lands because it did not
contemplate that Indian tribes could hold land in fee simple.156 In Tonkawa
Tribe of Oklahoma v. Richards, 57 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated
that the Nonintercourse Act was very general and comprehensive.158 The
Act's operation did not depend on the nature of the title of the land.159 The
court held that the tribe's interest in land was protected under the
Nonintercourse Act whether the tribal interest was based on aboriginal
right, purchase, or transfer from a state. 160 The court stated that the Act not
only reached conveyances by a tribe, but also any state action that purported
to divest a tribe of an interest in land.161
Over the last fifteen years, the trend has been to make a distinction
between Indian trust or tribal lands and lands that Indian tribes hold in fee
simple.162 Indian trust lands constitute real property, which the United
States holds title in trust for the tribe.163 There is a great deal of authority
indicating that the protection of the Nonintercourse Act no longer applies to
land that Indian tribes have purchased in fee simple after Congress has
terminated its trust obligation. 164 Federal law recognizes that Indian tribes
may hold lands in fee simple that may not be subject to the trust
relationship.165 Many cases have held that the Nonintercourse Act does not
protect tribal fee land from being subjected to taxation.166 In Bay Mills
155. Penobscot Indian Nation v. Key Bank, 112 F.3d 538, 553 n.18 (5th Cir. 1997).
156. Id. at 549.
157. 75 F.3d 1039 (5th Cir. 1996).
158. See Tonkawa Tribe, 75 F.3d at 1045 (adjudicating the Tribe's attempt to compel Texas
to donate former aboriginal lands to the Tribe under 1866 treaty and the Nonintercourse Act).
159. Id.
160. id.
161. Id. at 1046.
162. Penobscot Indian Nation v. Key Bank, 112 F.3d 538, 546 (5th Cir. 1997).
163. Id. at 554.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 546; 25 U.S.C. § 1466 (2000) (allowing title to land purchased by a tribe or
individual Indian outside reservation boundaries to be taken into trust or in the name of the
purchasers with no restrictions on alienation, control, or use).
166. See Lummi Indian Tribe v. Whatcom County, 5 F.3d 1355, 1359 (9th Cir. 1993)
(holding that lands approved for alienation by the federal government and then reacquired by
Tribe did not then become inalienable by operation of the Nonintercourse Act); see also Bay Mills
Indian Cmty. v. State, 626 N.W.2d 169, 174 (Mich. App. 2001) (holding tax sale of property was
not a violation of Nonintercourse Act); Mashpee Tribe v. Watt, 542 F. Supp. 797, 803 (D. Mass.
1982) (concluding it was clear that the Nonintercourse Act applied only to land held under
aboriginal title); Anderson & Middleton Lumber Co. v. Quinault Indian Nation, 929 P.2d 379, 387
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Indian Community v. State, 67 the Michigan Court of Appeals held that the
Nonintercourse Act applied only to voluntary conveyances by the tribes
themselves and not to involuntary conveyances by the state for nonpayment
of taxes.168 The court stated that once Congress removed the restraints on
alienation of land, the protections of the Nonintercourse Act no longer ap-
plied.169 Even reacquisition of fee-patented lands by an Indian tribe did not
reinstate the former restriction on alienation. 170
3. General Allotment Act
In the late 19th century, national policy changed from the segregation
of lands for the exclusive control of the tribes to a policy of allotting Indian
land to tribe members individually.171 For the history and background in-
formation of the General Allotment Act (GAA), Justice Scalia was fre-
quently cited in his opinion in Yakima.172 Justice Scalia stated that the
objectives of the GAA were simple and clear cut; the intent was to
"extinguish tribal sovereignty, erase reservation boundaries, and force the
assimilation of Indians."173
The General Allotment Act of 1887 bestowed citizenship upon all
Indians receiving allotments, but only after the expiration of a twenty-five
year trust. 174 Under this Act, the President was empowered to allot most
tribal lands nationwide without obtaining consent of the Indian nations
involved.175 Immediate alienation or encumbrance was restricted by pro-
viding that each piece of allotted land would be held by the United States in
trust for twenty-five years or longer; the fee patent would not be issued to
the Indian allottee until that time expired. 176 When the trust period expired,
(Wash. 1996) (holding the Nonintercourse Act applied only to land acquired from Indian tribes,
and not acquired by Indian tribes).
167. 626 N.W.2d 169 (Mich. App. 2001).
168. Bay Mills, 626 N.W.2d at 174.
169. Id. (citing Lummi Indian Tribe, 5 F.3d at 1359).
170. Quinault, 929 P.2d at 383 (citing Lummi Indian Tribe, 5 F.3d at 1358-59).
171. County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502
U.S. 251, 253-54 (1992).
172. id. at 253-55.
173. Id. at 254.
174. Indian General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 331-358 (2000) (§§ 331-333 repealed by Act Nov. 7, 2000, Pub. L. 106-462, Title I, §
106(a)(1))); Delos Sacket Otis, History of the Allotment Policy, in FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra
note 91, at 166.




a fee patent was issued that removed all restrictions as to sale,
encumbrance, or taxation of the land. 177
In the first two years after enactment, Congress ratified thirteen
agreements for sale of "surplus" lands. 78 The Board of Indian Commis-
sioners estimated that the 104,314,349 acres of Indian reservation land in
1889 was reduced by 12,000,000 acres in 1890 and another 8,000,000 acres
in the first nine months of 1891.179 By the end of the allotment era in 1934,
Indian land holdings were cut from 138,000,000 acres to 48,000,000
acres.180 More than eighty percent of the land belonging to Indians, and
more than eighty-five percent of the land allotted to Indians, had been taken
away. 181
Congress eventually halted the allotment program, yet it did not restore
fee patented or homestead lands to tribal ownership. 182 The Secretary of the
Interior was authorized to purchase fee lands and return them to the tribes in
trust, but the provisions affected only a fraction of the millions of acres lost
to fee ownership.183 The vast majority of land that passed into fee during
the allotment period remains as fee land today.184 This legacy of allotment
continues to be reflected in the modern court decisions that divest tribes of
both territory and sovereignty. 185
In Yakima, the Court noted that Congress authorized reacquisition of
allotted lands into trust but made no attempt to undo the dramatic effects the
allotment years had on the ownership of former Indian lands that had
become fee patented lands.186 There were no restraints imposed on the a-
bility of Indian allottees to alienate or encumber their fee patented lands,
nor were any restrictions placed on non-Indians who had acquired title to
over two-thirds of Indian lands allotted under the Act. 87
177. Anderson & Middleton Lumber Co. v. Quinault Indian Nation, 929 P.2d 379, 382
(Wash. 1996).
178. Otis, supra note 174, at 169.
179. Id.
180. The Purposes and Operation of the Wheeler-Howard Indian Rights Bill, Hearings on
H.R. 7902 Before the Senate and House Comm. on Indian Affairs, 73rd Cong. 15-18 (1934)
(memorandum by John Collier), in FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 91, at 171.
181. Id. at 172.
182. Royster, supra note 100, at 17.
183. Id.
184. ld. at 17-18.
185. Id. at 18.
186. Anderson & Middleton Lumber Co. v. Quinault Indian Nation, 929 P.2d 379, 383
(1996) (quoting County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,
502 U.S. 251, 255-56 (1992)).
187. Id. (quoting Yakima, 502 U.S. at 255-56).
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4. Indian Reorganization Act
The policy of allotting tribal lands proved to be "disastrous for the
Indians," and was "administratively unworkable as well as economically
wasteful." 88 In response to this failed policy, Congress passed The Indian
Reorganization (Wheeler-Howard) Act of 1934 (IRA), reversing govern-
mental policy toward Indian affairs.189 The purpose of the IRA was
primarily to give federal support in the re-establishment of tribal govern-
ments. 90  First, all further allotment was stopped.1 9  Second, the trust
period for allotted land was extended indefinitely.192 Third, it limited the
sale or transfer of Indian land and authorized the Secretary of the Interior to
restore tribal ownership to any reservation lands that had not been
allotted.193 Finally, the statute allowed the Secretary of the Interior to take
land into trust for Indians.194 A ten million dollar revolving loan fund was
established for the repurchase of land that had been taken out of trust and
the return of "surplus" lands not homesteaded by non-Indians. 195
The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) was initially aggressive in seeking
funds to implement the purchase program, but appropriations steadily
declined. 196 Between 1936 and 1974, almost 600,000 acres were restored to
tribal ownership. 97 However, more than three times that amount, a total of
1,811,010 acres of existing tribal lands, were condemned for other pur-
poses.198 Federal water projects comprised almost half a million of the
acres that were taken. 99 Even since the passage of the IRA, more land has
been taken from the Indians than has been returned, due to inadequate
resources and the continual taking of Indian lands under eminent domain. 200
It was not until the legal relationship between Indian tribes and the
federal government evolved dramatically in the twentieth century that
courts and Congress began distinguishing between restricted and
188. Id. at 382 (quoting Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 707 (1987)).
189. Id.; 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1934).
190. Jessica A. Shoemaker, Like Snow in the Spring Time: Allotment, Fractionation, and the
Indian Land Tenure Problem, 2003 Wis. L. REV. 729, 744 (2003).
191. 25 U.S.C. § 461.
192. Id. § 462.
193. Id. §§ 463-64.
194. Id. § 465.
195. Shoemaker, supra note 190, at 744.




200. Shoemaker, supra note 190, at 744-45.
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unrestricted tribal lands.201 A legacy of the congressional fluctuation in
Indian policy is a "checkerboard layout" of land ownership within the bor-
ders of many reservations. 202 It has become difficult to determine which
private land holdings inside or bordering a reservation retain Indian
Country status. 203 The common practice was to reference the geographic
extent of a reservation by relying on the original treaty boundaries.204 Land
was often removed from the reservation during the Allotment Period and
later restored or replaced, creating uncertainty as to a reservation's juris-
dictional boundaries. 205 Reservations that used to be exclusively owned by
tribes now include considerable areas of non-tribal private holdings. 206
Although the allotment policy was officially terminated in 1934, it
continues to influence the Supreme Court's Indian law policy today. 207 In
some respects, the adverse impact of the allotment program has grown over
the past fifteen years as courts place greater significance on the ownership
status of land when determining tribal sovereignty. 208
D. CONFLICT BETWEEN SOVEREIGNS
Sovereign immunity has been asserted in actions between states in
many instances. 209 In Hoagland v. Streeper,210 the Illinois Supreme Court
held that the jurisdiction of a state may extend through its boundaries. 211
The court stated it knew of no principle that prevented a state court from
201. Penobscot Indian Nation v. Key Bank, 112 F.3d 538, 549 (5th Cir. 1997).
202. 0. Wes J. Layton, The Thorny Gift: Analysis of EPA's Intent to Empower Indian Tribal
Governments with Clean Air Act Regulatory Authority over Non-Tribal Lands and Immunize
Tribal Governments from CAA Citizen Suits, 7 ENVTL. L. 225, 237 (2001) (quoting Yankton
Sioux Tribe v. Gaffey, 188 F.3d 1010, 1013 (8th Cir. 1999)).




207. Royster, supra note 100, at 7.
208. Kevin. J. Worthen, State and Local Authority to Tax Tribally Owned Land: Ifa Tribe
Can Sell It, Can State and Local Governments Tax It? 5 PREVIEW U.S. SUP. CT. CAS. 316 (Feb.
12, 1998), LEXIS, 5 PREVIEW 316 at *6.
209. See Paulus v. South Dakota (Paulus I), 201 N.W. 867, 870 (N.D. 1924) (declining
jurisdiction in a suit against sister state that arose from an accident in a coal mine owned by South
Dakota but located in North Dakota); see also Paulus v. South Dakota (Paulus II), 227 N.W. 52,
54 (N.D. 1929) (holding South Dakota had immunity from suit as a sovereign because operation
of a coal mine in North Dakota was for a public purpose); but see Georgia v. Chattanooga, 264
U.S. 472, 479-80 (1924) (prohibiting Georgia from asserting a defense of sovereign immunity in
Tennessee's condemnation action of land that was owned by Georgia but located within
Tennessee borders); Hoagland v. Streeper, 145 N.E.2d 625, 629 (Ill. 1957) (holding Missouri
could not assert defense of sovereign immunity against Illinois regarding a bridge owned by
Missouri but located in Illinois).
210. 145 N.E.2d 625 (I11. 1957).
211. Hoagland, 145 N.E.2d at 629.
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exercising jurisdiction over land within its boundaries because of the
existence of an interest beyond its jurisdiction. 212 The court held that the
sovereignty of one state does not extend into the territory of another to
create immunity from suit.21 3 Land acquired by one state in another state
remains subject to the laws of the latter state; it is treated as if it is privately
owned and the owner cannot maintain its sovereign privileges or im-
munities. 21 4 The court stated that: "If it were otherwise, the acquisition of
land in Illinois by another state would effect a separate island of sover-
eignty within our boundaries." 2 15
In Georgia v. Chattanooga,16 Georgia received permission to build a
railroad from its state boundary to the city of Chattanooga, Tennessee. 2 17
The Supreme Court held that Georgia's sovereign immunity did not extend
into Tennessee.2 18 When Tennessee brought an action to condemn a por-
tion of the land to build a street, the Court held that it was not impaired by
the fact that a sister state owned the land.2 19 The Court stated that Georgia
could not claim a sovereign or immunity privilege when it acquired land in
another state for the purpose of using it in a private capacity. 220 The power
of a state to condemn did not depend upon the consent of the owner, even
when that owner was a sister sovereign.221
Conversely, in Paulus v. South Dakota (Paulus 1),222 Paulus was a
South Dakota resident working in a coal mine located in North Dakota, but
owned by South Dakota.223 When Paulus was injured at work, he brought
suit in a North Dakota court against the State of South Dakota, alleging that
South Dakota was acting as a private corporation rather than a sovereign
state when it engaged in the mining business.224 The North Dakota
Supreme Court said "[ilt is so well settled that an action cannot be
maintained against a state without its consent that the citation of




215. Id. at 630.
216. 264 U.S. 472 (1924).
217. Georgia, 264 U.S. at 480-81.
218. Id. at 481.
219. Id. at 479.
220. Id. at 479-80.
221. Id. at 482.
222. 201 N.W. 867 (N.D. 1924).
223. Paulus 1, 201 N.W. at 867.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 869.
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jurisdiction on principles of comity. 226 When the same plaintiff brought the
suit again, but now as a resident of North Dakota, the court dismissed the
case the second time based on South Dakota's sovereign immunity.227
In Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak,228 the United States Supreme
Court held that the immunity possessed by Indian tribes is not coextensive
with that of the states. 229 The Court stated that the states may have sur-
rendered their immunity from suit due to mutuality of concession, but it
would be absurd to suggest the tribes surrendered their immunity in the
Constitutional Convention at which they were not even a party. 230 The
Court reasoned that if the Convention did not surrender the tribes' im-
munity for the benefit of the states, it also did not surrender the states'
immunity for the benefit of the tribes.231
In Anderson & Middleton Lumber Co. v. Quinault Indian Nation,232 the
Washington Supreme Court stated that the Allotment Act provision that
removed all restrictions to sale, encumbrance, or taxation of fee patented
reservation land described a state's range of "jurisdiction to tax" allotted
land, not the entire range of a state's in rem jurisdiction over the pro-
perty. 233 The court held that the sale of an interest in property to an entity
enjoying sovereign immunity was of no consequence because in personam
jurisdiction was not required. 234 When the property is inalienable and en-
cumberable under a federally issued fee patent, it is subject to a state court
in rem action. 235 Reacquisition by a federally recognized Indian tribe did
not alter the result.236 The court cited the Yakima decision, stating the
Supreme Court held that there was a broad statutory grant of in rem state
jurisdiction over tribal fee patented lands. 237
226. See id. (holding that plaintiff was required to seek relief from the court in his own state).
Judicial comity is the courtesy a court from one state shows a court from another state by recog-
nizing its judicial decisions, not as a matter of obligation, but out of deference and respect for the
other. 16 AM. JUR. 2D Conflicts ofLaws § 16 (1998).
227. Paulus v. South Dakota (Paulus II), 227 N.W. 52, 54 (N.D. 1929).
228. 501 U.S. 775 (1991).
229. Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 782.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. 929 P.2d 379 (Wash. 1996) (en banc).




237. Id. at 386.
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HI. ANALYSIS
The decision in Cass County Joint Water Resource District v. 1.43
Acres of Land,238 written by Justice Neumann, unanimously reversed the
district court. 239 Three issues were addressed by the court. 240 The primary
issue was whether the district court could exercise jurisdiction over a
condemnation action against fee land owned by the Turtle Mountain Band
of Chippewa Indians.241 The second issue was whether the Federal Non-
intercourse Act prohibited the condemnation of land belonging to the
Tribe.242 These first two issues regarding a state's power to condemn land
owned by an Indian tribe are the focus of this comment.
The third issue quickly dispensed of by the court was whether Shea, the
original conveyor, needed to be included as a defendant in the action.
243
The court cited North Dakota statutory authority to demonstrate the need
for the inclusion of Shea as a defendant in the suit.244 The court reasoned
that including all record title holders in a final condemnation judgment
would assure that the condemnor received clear title to the property. 245 The
court stated that there would be little practical difference between retaining
Shea as a defendant and dismissing him in an in rem condemnation
action.246 He could not be subjected to any personal liability, and if he
claimed no interest in the property, he did not have to participate. 247
A. JURISDICTION
The court presented the primary issue as one of first impression
nationally: "May a state condemn land within its territorial boundaries
which has been purchased in fee by an Indian tribe, but which is not
reservation land, aboriginal land, allotted land, or trust land?"
248
238. 2002 ND 83, 643 N.W.2d 685.
239. 1.43 Acres of Land, 40, 643 N.W.2d at 699.
240. Id. 55 6, 39, 643 N.W.2d at 688, 699.
241. Id. 116, 643 N.W.2d at 688:
242. Id. 27, 643 N.W.2d at 696.
243. Id. 36, 643 N.W.2d at 698.
244. Id. 35 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-15-18(2) (1994)). The complaint in a condem-
nation action should contain the names of all owners and claimants of the property at the time of
commencement of the action. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-15-18(2).
245. Cass County Joint Water Res. Dist. v. 1.43 Acres of Land, 2002 ND 83, 5 37, 643
N.W.2d 685, 699.
246. Id. at 698.
247. Id.
248. Id. 6, 643 N.W.2d at 688.
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First the court addressed what type of jurisdiction is required for a
condemnation action. 249 The court examined case law and determined it
had been well settled that a condemnation action was strictly in rem.250 The
court agreed with the authorities it examined, holding that in personam
jurisdiction was not necessary because a proceeding in rem was an action
against the property itself.251
The court noted the general rule for in rem jurisdiction: a decision in
rem does not impose liability directly on a person, it operates directly
against the property, whether or not the owner is subject to the court's
jurisdiction.252 The court held that a proceeding in rem takes no cognizance
of an owner with a beneficial interest because it is only against the property
itself.253 The decision is binding, even in the absence of personal juris-
diction or notice to the parties.2 54
The court addressed the minimum contacts doctrine described in
Shaffer.255 There, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that in
rem jurisdiction can be exercised without acquiring in personam juris-
diction over a party, but required that there be minimum contacts between
the party and the forum state in order to accomplish due process. 256 The
North Dakota Supreme Court stated there was no due process problem in
1.43 Acres of Land.257 It held that the Tribe had sufficient contacts with the
state to satisfy due process through its ownership of the subject property
and other activities within the state. 258
249. Id. T 7.
250. See id. T 8, 643 N.W.2d at 688-89 (listing several citations stating a condemnation
action requires only in rem jurisdiction); see, e.g., United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372,
376 (1946); Farley v. State, 350 S.E.2d 263, 264 (Ga. App. 1986); Utilities, Inc. v. Washington
Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 763 A.2d 129, 135 (Md. App. 2000); McKenzie County v. Hodel,
467 N.W.2d 701, 705 (N.D. 1991); State Highway Comm'n v. Clark, 395 P.2d 146, 148 (Or.
1964); In re Seattle, 353 P.2d 955, 957 (Wash. 1960).
251. See Cass County Joint Water Res. Dist. v. 1.43 Acres of Land, 2002 ND 83, 8, 643
N.W.2d 685, 689 (citing divorce and custody actions as well as condemnation proceedings); see,
e.g., Phillips v. Chas. Schreiner Bank, 894 F.2d 127, 132 (5th Cir. 1990); Farley, 350 S.E.2d at
264; Caitlin v. Caitlin, 494 N.W.2d 581, 588 (N.D. 1992); Smith v. Smith, 459 N.W.2d 785, 787-
88 (N.D. 1990); Seattle, 353 P.2d at 957-58.
252. 1.43 Acres of Land, T 9, 643 N.W.2d at 689 (quoting 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 80
(1995)).
253. Id. (quoting I AM. JUR. 2D Actions § 34 (1994)).
254. Id.
255. Id. T 10 (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 199 (1977)).
256. Id. (quoting Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 199).
257. Id. at 689.
258. Id. at 690.
2004]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
The court also addressed notice. 259 It held that the purpose of serving a
summons and complaint was only to provide an opportunity to be heard.
260
To comport with due process, property owners are given notice and an
opportunity to be heard so they may appear and defend in the condemnation
action.261
B. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The court addressed whether tribal immunity bars the condemnation
action.262 The court declared that it did not question the continued validity
of the doctrine of tribal immunity, just whether or not it applied in this
case.263 The court described the issue presented in this case as a novel
question of whether tribal sovereign immunity barred a purely in rem action
against land held by the Tribe in fee that was not reservation land, allotted
land, aboriginal land, or trust land. 264 The court observed that the Tribe re-
lied heavily on cases that stressed the continued validity of tribal sovereign
immunity.265 However, the court stated the continued validity of the doc-
trine of tribal sovereign immunity was not in question, and the Tribe did not
cite any cases holding that this doctrine of immunity barred a purely in rem
condemnation action in state court.
266
The court recognized that other jurisdictions had established dis-
tinctions when applying the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity based on
whether the proceeding is in rem or in personam jurisdiction.267 The court
observed that the United States Supreme Court indicated the states may
exercise broader jurisdiction in an in rem proceeding over tribal lands.
268
The court reviewed the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Burke Act of
1906, an amendment to the Indian General Allotment Act.269 The court
259. Id. 5 11.
260. See id. (citing case law supporting the rule that the property owner is only named as a
party to enable him to have a hearing about the disposition of the res); see, e.g., United States v.
Dunnington, 146 U.S. 338, 352 (1892); United States v. Winn, 83 F. Supp. 172, 174-75 (W.D.S.C.
1949); Farley v. State, 350 S.E.2d 263, 264 (Ga. App. 1986); In re Seattle, 353 P.2d 955, 957-58
(Wash. 1960).
261. Cass County Joint Water Res. Dist. v. 1.43 Acres of Land, 2002 N.D. 83, TJ 11, 643
N.W.2d 685, 690 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-15-18, 32-15-20) (1994)).
262. Id. 5 12, 643 N.W.2d at 690-91.
263. Id. at 691.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 690-9 1.
266. Id. at 691.
267. Id. 5 13.
268. Id. (citing County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian
Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 257-58 (1992)).
269. Id. 5 14 (citing Yakima, 502 U.S. at 254).
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noted that the Supreme Court had addressed a state's authority over tribal
land based on the jurisdictional nature of the proceedings.270 The court
concluded that jurisdiction over fee patented lands located on the reser-
vation was permissible if it was in rem rather than in personam.271 The
court noted that the Supreme Court affirmed an ad valorem property tax in
Yakima because it was an in rem tax on the property itself; whereas the
excise tax was impermissible because it was transactional, implicating in
personam jurisdiction.272
The North Dakota Supreme Court then analyzed Quinault, which
involved a quiet title action brought by a lumber company against property
located on an Indian reservation. 273 The court noted that Quinault relied on
the reasoning in Yakima to determine that the trial court had proper
jurisdiction.274 The court agreed with the conclusion of Quinault, that sale
of property to a sovereign is irrelevant because it is an in rem proceeding.275
The court recognized that even reacquisition of a portion of land by a tribe
does not change the result because reacquisition of fee land has no effect on
the land's alienable status. 276 The court agreed with the consistency in the
reasoning of Quinault and Yakima.277
Because this was a question of first impression, the North Dakota
Supreme Court examined other analogous situations, such as the question of
whether a state's sovereign immunity barred a condemnation action in the
courts of other states.278 The court first looked to Georgia v. Chattanooga
where the state of Georgia purchased land in Tennessee for a railroad,
which was later sought to be condemned as a right of way for a street.279
The court noted that the United States Supreme Court held Tennessee's
right to condemn overruled Georgia's claim of sovereign immunity,
because the right to condemn does not depend on the consent of the
owner.280
270. Id. 1 15 (quoting Yakima, 502 U.S. at 264-65).
271. Id. (quoting Yakima, 502 U.S. at 264-65).
272. Id. The Court in Yakima acknowledged the narrow interpretation of the Burke Act,
addressing only the range of jurisdiction to tax, not the entire range of in rem jurisdiction states
may exercise over fee patented reservation land. Yakima, 502 U.S. at 265-66, 268.
273. Cass County Joint Water Res. Dist. v. 1.43 Acres of Land, 2002 ND 83, 16, 643
N.W.2d 685, 692 (citing Anderson & Middleton Lumber Co. v. Quinault Indian Nation, 929 P.2d
379, 385 (Wash. 1996)).
274. Id. $ 17 (quoting Quinault, 929 P.2d at 385).
275. Id. (quoting Quinault, 929 P.2d at 385).
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. T 19, 643 N.W.2d at 693.
279. Id. (citing Georgia v. Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472, 479-82 (1924)).
280. Id. (quoting Georgia, 264 U.S. at 479-82).
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The court agreed with the authorities it examined and concluded that
the district court could validly exercise jurisdiction over the condemnation
action.281 The court determined that the Tribe's sovereign immunity was
not implicated because the action was an in rem condemnation action.
282
Moreover, the land was essentially private land that had been purchased by
the Tribe, and was not located on a reservation or part of the Tribe's
aboriginal land.283 Furthermore, the land was neither allotted land nor trust
land. 284
The North Dakota Supreme Court found that 1.43 Acres of Land
presented competing claims of sovereignty-the Tribe's sovereign
immunity from suit in a state court and the state's power of eminent
domain. 285 The court focused on public policy when it addressed how im-
portant the state's power of eminent domain was for the proper performance
of governmental functions.2 86 The court concluded that if the decision of
the district court was affirmed, it would have far-reaching effects on the
eminent domain authority of the states.287 The court reasoned that if it ruled
in favor of the Tribe, then tribes would have veto power over any public
works project just by purchasing a small tract of land within the project's
boundaries.2 88 The court stated it did not question the sincerity of the
Tribe's motives in purchasing the 1.43 acres, but the potential ramifications
of the issue were important.289 The North Dakota Supreme Court agreed
with the lower court's observation that the common sense result that would
arise if tribal immunity barred condemnation proceedings was that any non-
Indian could convey property to an Indian Tribe that was not even located
in North Dakota strictly for purposes of stalling any public improvement
project. 290 The court concluded that such a result was too great an in-
fringement upon the state's sovereign immunity.
291
C. FEDERAL NONINTERCOURSE ACT
The second issue addressed by the North Dakota Supreme Court was
whether the restraints of the Nonintercourse Act automatically attached to
281. Id. 20, 643 N.W.2d at 694.




286. Id. IT 23-24.
287. Id. 24.
288. Id.




property an Indian tribe purchased from a private landowner, when the
property had been made freely alienable by the federal government when it
issued a fee patent.292 The court disagreed with the Tribe's argument that
even if the condemnation action was not barred by tribal sovereign im-
munity, condemnation of the property would be a violation of the Federal
Nonintercourse Act.293 The court found that the question presented was
whether the Nonintercourse Act protected fee land the Tribe purchased
from a private landowner.294
The North Dakota Supreme Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit's
holding in Lummi Indian Tribe v. Whatcom County,295 where the court con-
cluded that no court had ever held that alienable land automatically became
inalienable when it was repurchased by a tribe.296 The court accepted the
Washington Supreme Court's reasoning in Quinault, where the court held
that even though the Nonintercourse Act preempted state law affecting
ownership of Indian trust land, the protections of the Act did not apply to
lands made alienable under a federally issued fee patent. 297 The court
agreed that even a subsequent reacquisition by a tribe did not change the
result.298 After analyzing Bay Mills, the court determined that the Michigan
Court of Appeals holding was similar as well, and agreed that the
protections of the Nonintercourse Act did not apply to land after the
restraints on alienation had been removed. 299
The court concluded that this result was even clearer in 1.43 Acres of
Land because the Tribe's interest in the land was far more tenuous than in
many of the other cases where the land in dispute was located on a reser-
vation, or the land had previously been in trust and was reacquired by a
tribe.30o This piece of land had never been held in trust for the Turtle
Mountain Band, nor any other tribe. 30' The land was fee-patented land that
292. Id. 5 27, 643 N.W.2d at 696.
293. Id. 5 26, 643 N.W.2d at 695. The Act provides, in pertinent part, "[n]o purchase, grant,
lease, or other conveyance of lands ... from any Indian nation.., shall be of any validity in law
or equity, unless the same be made by treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the
Constitution." 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2001).
294. Cass County Joint Water Res. Dist. v. 1.43 Acres of Land, 2002 ND 83, 27, 643
N.W.2d 685,696.
295. 5 F.3d 1355 (9th Cir. 1993).
296. 1.43 Acres of Land, 29, 643 N.W.2d at 696 (quoting Lummi, 5 F.3d at 1359).
297. Id. 5 30, 643 N.W.2d at 697 (quoting Anderson & Middleton Lumber Co. v. Quinault
Indian Nation, 929 P.2d 379, 387 (Wash. 1996)).
298. Id. (quoting Quinault, 929 P.2d at 388).
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had been held in private ownership for over one hundred years. 302 The
court held that the Nonintercourse Act did not preclude the condemnation
action, because the protections of the Act did not apply to this piece of land
that had been purchased by the Tribe from a private landowner.
303
D. SUMMARY OF COURT'S HOLDING
Reversing the district court, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that
the district court did have valid jurisdiction in the condemnation action by
the District of the 1.43 acres of land owned by the Turtle Mountain Band of
Chippewa Indians. 304 The Tribe's defense of tribal sovereign immunity,
while a valid doctrine, was not applicable in this situation because the con-
demnation action was strictly an in rem proceeding. 305 The court also held
that the Nonintercourse Act was not a valid defense when the land at issue
was fee patented land, because once it had been made alienable by Con-
gress, it did not become inalienable simply because of reacquisition by an
Indian tribe.306
IV. IMPACT
The Maple River Dam would be a seventy-foot high earthen embank-
ment dry dam capable of retaining 60,000 acre-feet of floodwater. 307 The
total cost of the project was originally estimated to be $13.8 million. 308 The
dam's purpose is to reduce the duration and peak of floodwaters on over
100,000 acres between Durbin and Argusville. 309 The District estimates
that the average annual benefit from the dam would be over $4,000,000.310
The dam is the last phase of a four-pronged approach to flood protection
designed in 1985, which is the result of studies that began in the 1950's.311
Fargo's newspaper, The Forum, reported that the dam would completely or
302. Id.
303. Id. 5 33, 643 N.W.2d at 698.
304. Id. 5 20, 643 N.W.2d at 694.
305. Id. 5 12, 20, 643 N.W.2d at 691,694.
306. Id. 5 32, 643 N.W.2d at 697.
307. N.D. STATE WATER COMM'N, 2003-2005 WATER DEVELOPMENT REPORT: AN
UPDATE TO THE 1999 STATE WATER MANAGEMENT PLAN, 15 (2002). A "dry dam" means it
would only hold water immediately after a flood event. Id.
308. Mike Nowatzki, Maple River Dam Project Gets Boost, FORUM (Fargo), Dec. 24, 2002,
at A6.
309. Interview with Steven McCullough, Attorney for Cass County Joint Water Resource





partially flood about ten farms along the Maple River near Enderlin. 312
However, the District claims that only two farms would have to be
relocated, one of which is presently abandoned.313
A. TRADITIONAL CULTURAL PROPERTIES
One issue the North Dakota Supreme Court did not address in 1.43
Acres of Land was the Tribe's argument that the land subject to
condemnation was an ancestral burial ground.314 The court stated it had
considered the remaining issues and arguments raised by the Tribe but
found them to be either without merit or unnecessary to the decision. 3 15 It
stated there were factual disputes remaining on the issue of the tribal burial
grounds, and it was unnecessary to address the issue on appeal from a
judgment dismissing on the basis of tribal sovereign immunity. 316
Jane Lone Fight of Mandaree, an Ojibwa Indian, is a member of the
North Dakota Intertribal Reinternment Committee. 317 Lone Fight said that
the Cheyenne, Dakota Sioux, Ojibwa and Hidatsa had all lived in the area at
one time and that there were at least five ancient village sites.318
Becky Otto, an archeologist for the USACE, stated that American
Indians have raised concerns about the 2,800 acres of land that would be
flooded when the dam was at full capacity, because the area contains a high
number of archeological sites and traditional cultural properties such as
burial grounds and sacred sites. 319 In particular, the 1.43-acre tract of land
in Highland Township that was sold to the Tribe by Roger Shea, contained
human remains and was eligible to be listed on the National Register of
Historic Places. 320 Another piece of land owned by Shea in the area was
placed on the National Register of Historic Places in 1996.321 Otto stated
the reason for the delays in issuing the permit for the dam was because the
Corps was working with the State Historic Preservation Office and tribal
312. Deneen Gilmour, Tribal Committee Fears Dam Will Harm Indian Burial Sites, FORUM
(Fargo), May 15, 1999, at A3.
313. Interview with McCullough, supra note 309.
314. Cass County Water Res. Dist. v. 1.43 Acres of Land, 2002 ND 83, 39, 643 N.W.2d
685, 699 n.2.
315. Id. at 699.
316. Id.n.2.
317. Janelle Cole, Proposed Maple Dam Put on Hold, Likelihood of Indian Artifacts Delays
Construction Permit, FORUM (Fargo), May 19, 1999, at Al.
318. Id.
319. Nowatzki, supra note 308, at A6.
320. Id.
321. Cole, supra note 317, at Al.
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groups to develop mitigation options for culturally sensitive sites in the
dam's holding area. 322
B. STRONG OPPOSITION DIVIDES THE COMMUNITY
The Forum followed this case from its inception, publishing over fifty
articles on the project and the surrounding controversy between 1996 and
2003.323 Despite the minimal attention given by the North Dakota Supreme
Court to the issue regarding the Tribe's claims that the land contained tra-
ditional cultural sites, a great deal of the media attention's focus and the
press reports were precisely about that issue. 324 The Forum reported that
this case and its impact were being watched well beyond Cass County and
the Maple River Dam area. 325
Numerous letters to the editor received from citizens were published as
well. 326 People either loved or hated the proposed dam idea, depending on
322. Nowatzki, supra note 308, at A6.
323. See, e.g., Deneen Gilmour, Sinking Feeling, Farmers Say Proposed Dam Leaves Their
Future Up in the Air, FORUM (Fargo), Dec. 22, 1996, at Al; Deneen Gilmour, Group Seeks to
Speed Maple River Dam Work, FORUM (Fargo), Apr. 29, 1997, at C1; Nichole Aksamit, Farmers
Seek to Stop Dam Project, FORUM (Fargo), Jun. 11, 1997, at A 1; Nichole Aksamit, Maple River
Dam Opponents Run Into Another Deaf Wall, FORUM (Fargo), Jun. 19, 1997, at Al; Deneen
Gilmour, Proposed Dam Has Farmers Concerned, FORUM (Fargo), Jun. 28, 1997, at A 1; Deneen
Gilmour, Weary from Waiting, Residents Want Answers about Dam - NOW, FORUM (Fargo), Jul.
26, 1997, at A6; Deneen Gilmour, Water Board Reassures Cass Residents, FORUM (Fargo), Jan.
24, 1998, at C 1; Patrick Condon, Permit Process Holds Up Dam Construction, FORUM (Fargo),
Feb. 14, 1998, at C1; Deneen Gilmour, Water Board Hopes Plan Will Speed Dam Permit, FORUM
(Fargo), Apr. 18, 1998, at A10; Brad Christopher, Cass Water Board Reviewing Maple River Dam
Environmental Impact Study, FORUM (Fargo), Jul. 25, 1998, at A5; Deneen Gilmour, Maple River
Dam Nearer to Reality, FORUM (Fargo), Nov. 13, 1998, at Al; Deneen Gilmour, Maple River
Opponents Plan to Petition Corps, FORUM (Fargo), Jan. 15, 1999, at B 1; Deneen Gilmour, Corps
Gets Earful on Maple River Dam, FORUM (Fargo), Feb. 26, 1999, at Al; Deneen Gilmour,
Residents Want Decision on Dam, FORUM (Fargo), May 5, 2001, at Al; Forum and Wire Reports,
Water Board Appeals Dam Condemnation, FORUM (Fargo), Sept. 8, 2001, at A6.
324. See supra note 323 and accompanying text.
325. Janelle Cole, Supreme Court Takes Up Maple River Dam Case, Dispute Questions
Whether Indian Band's Rights Can Block Condemnation, FORUM (Fargo), Jan. 31, 2002, at C5.
326. See, e.g., Roger Shea, Letter to the Editor, Water Board's Maple River Dam Plan is
Flawed and Unfair, FORUM (Fargo), May 14, 1996, at A4; Steven and Kathy Fleischfresser, Letter
to the Editor, Dam Proponents Ignore Environment, Families, FORUM (Fargo), Feb. 11, 1999, at
A4; Tom Speikermeier, Letter to the Editor, Dam Threatens Unique Heritage of Communities,
FORUM (Fargo), Feb. 14, 1999, at E5; Timothy Jorgenson, Letter to the Editor, Proposed Maple
River Dam Threatens Enderlin, FORUM (Fargo), Mar. 23, 1999, at A4; Roger Shea et al., Letter to
the Editor, Editorial was Aggravating, Racist, FORUM (Fargo), May 30, 1999, at E5; Eugene
Johnson, Letter to the Editor, More Than a Few Oppose Dam Proposal, FORUM (Fargo), Mar. 17,
2001, at A4; David Nudell, Letter to the Editor, Benefits of Dam Doubtful, FORUM (Fargo), May
26, 2001, at AI5; Denis Gross, Letter to the Editor, Maple River Dam is Wrong Way to Go,
FORUM (Fargo), Jun. 9, 2001, at A17; Roger Shea, Letter to the Editor, Hoeven Misinformed
About Sacred Significance of Land, FORUM (Fargo), Jun. 28, 2001; Donald Ogaard and Robert
Thompson, Letter to the Editor, Editorial was Injustice to Local Water Managers, FORUM
(Fargo), Jun. 28, 2002, at AI5; Jeffry Volk, Letter to the Editor, Dam Will Protect Many More
Acres, FORUM (Fargo), Jul. 17, 2003, at A13.
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where they lived.327 The citizens viewed the Maple River Dam as a source
of "salvation or ruination," with little lukewarm emotion in between. 328
Roger Shea is one of the farmers whose land would be flooded if the dam
was built.329 Shea was part of a group that called itself the Maple River
Alliance Against the Dam.330 The group was formed in the 1980's and was
joined by the tribes in 1994.331
Television stations, as well as the local newspaper, covered a cere-
monial transfer of land ownership from Roger Shea to the Tribe.332 Shea
stated he hoped it had a "huge chilling effect" on the plans for the dam. 333
The Tribe said it was a joyous occasion and very significant in extending its
tribal sovereignty. 334 Shea was paid in an old-fashioned way-beads and
blankets with some of the tribal totems on them.335 Chippewa tribal mem-
ber Jane Martin and Shea embraced and "struggled to keep tears from
flowing" as they swapped three woolen blankets and three beaded bolo ties
for the land deed.336
In June, 2001, The Forum reported another attempt to block the
condemnation proceedings, describing the controversy as a "tangled web of
emotion, economics, politics, tribal sovereignty issues, and back-
tracking." 337 The Tribe applied to the Federal Bureau of Indian Affairs
(BIA) to designate the 1.43-acre tract of land as federal Indian trust land.338
North Dakota Governor Hoeven supported the District by writing a letter to
the BIA asking it to deny the Tribe's request for trust land status. 339
Because of the likelihood of Indian burial sites, artifacts, and remnants
of villages, an archaeologist and historian were hired by the District to test
the proposed Maple River Dam site at a cost reported variously as $50,000
327. Deneen Gilmour, Passion Deep on Both Sides of Proposed Maple River Dam, FORUM
(Fargo), Oct. 10, 1997, at Al.
328. Id.
329. Mikkel Pates, Tribal Representatives Get Look at Proposed Dam Site, FORUM (Fargo),
Nov. 16, 1999, at CI.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Deneen Gilmour, Maple River Dam Plans in Jeopardy, Enderlin Farmer Sells 1.4 Acres




336. Deneen Gilmour, Farmer Trades Land for Beads and Blankets, Chippewa Take
Possession of Burial Site from Dam Opponent, FORUM (Fargo), Aug. 22, 2000, at Bi.
337. Deneen Gilmour, Maple River Dam Issue Thrown Another Curve, FORUM (Fargo), June
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or $500,000, excluding the legal and engineering costs on any
archaeological related issues. 340
With the permission of all area landowners other than Shea and the
Tribe, archaeologists looked at twenty-nine potential cultural sites near the
proposed dam area.341 They determined six of them merited more analysis,
but twenty-three were not of interest.342 The land owned by Shea and the
Tribe was not surveyed due to their refusal to allow the archaeologists on
the land.343 Unable to get a permit from USACE until a complete ar-
chaeological survey was completed, the District filed a condemnation action
with the plan of taking possession of the land and completing the survey.344
In district court, the Tribe prevailed in the condemnation proceeding
due to the protection of its sovereign immunity. 345 The District continued
trying to negotiate a settlement with Shea and the Tribe, while appealing the
district court's decision at the same time.346
The District originally applied to USACE for a permit for the dam in
1994, but due to all the controversy, the application has been stalled in a
"bureaucratic tangle" for years.34 7 According to Jeff Volk, the project engi-
neer, the best-case scenario would be for construction to begin in spring
2004, with a projected completion date of fall 2006.3" In 2000, Water
Board Chairman Tom Fischer said the District had already spent
$3,000,000 over the last six years trying to get USACE to make a decision
about whether to issue the dam permit.349 Due to all the delays, the dam's
projected costs have increased to $20.8 million, more than $7 million since
estimates given in 1994.350
340. Deneen Gilmour, Cass Water Board to Hire Archaeologist, Historian for Maple River
Dam Site, FORUM (Fargo), Aug. 28, 1999, at C1 (reporting costs of approximately $50,000);
Interview with McCullough, supra note 309 (describing costs of approximately $500,000).
341. Deneen Gilmour, Board Gets Tough in Bid for Dam Land, FORUM (Fargo), Dec. 16,
2000, at C 1.
342. Id.
343. Deneen Gilmour, Indian-Owned Land Condemned by Cass Water Board, FORUM
(Fargo), Jan. 27, 2001, at C1.
344. Deneen Gilmour, Effort to Condemn Land for Maple River Dam Project Stalls in Court,
FORUM (Fargo), Mar. 30, 2001, at BI.
345. Steven P. Wagner, Maple River Dam Clears Latest Hurdle, Corps' Final
Environmental Study Supports the Project, FORUM (Fargo), Dec. 4, 2001, at A6.
346. Id.
347. Deneen Gilmour, New Comment Period Stalls Maple River Dam, FORUM (Fargo), Oct.
23, 1999, at C1.
348. Amy Dalrymple, Landowner Feedback on Dam Cost Sought, FORUM (Fargo), Sept. 5,
2003, at A12.
349. Gilmour, Dam Plans in Jeopardy, supra note 332, at Al.
350. Nowatzki, supra note 308, at A6.
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After the North Dakota Supreme Court victory for the District, the
matter was settled and the land was condemned upon remand. 35' Inter-
estingly, in 1999, Shea reported to The Forum that he had been offered
$700 for his land.352 In 2001, the District offered Shea and the Tribe fair
market value for the land, which was $500.353 The condemnation judgment
received in district court was for $500: $300 to the Tribe and $200 to Roger
Shea.354 Yet ironically, after court costs were offset, Roger Shea ended up
with a judgment against him for $91.40, which he paid to the District.355
The Tribe only received $55.60 for its land after the offset of court costs. 356
C. ARCHAEOLOGICAL FINDINGS
After condemnation of the land, extensive testing was done. 357 It was
determined that the 1.43 acre tract did not have any human remains. 358
Engineer Amy Ollendorf reported that the condemned piece of land, as well
as the surrounding land that would potentially be periodically flooded, were
determined not to be eligible for inclusion on the National Register of
Historic Places. 359 The Army Corps of Engineers and the North Dakota
State Historic Preservation Office agreed that there are no traditional
cultural properties in that area of potential effect. 360 Although there were
no sacred sites or burial grounds in the area impacted by the dam, some
archeological sites were present. 36' However, at the time the North Dakota
Supreme Court made its decision, this information was unknown.362 After
making it through the court system, the District has only the permit hurdle
remaining, and the Army Corps is the last place where consideration of the
traditional cultural sites could be taken into account.363
351. Order of Judgment, District Court, County of Cass, East Central Judicial District at 1,
Cass County Joint Water Res. Dist. v. 1.43 Acres of Land, 2002 ND 83, 643 N.W.2d 685 (No. 09-
01 -C-0665).
352. Pates, supra note 329, at C1.
353. Gilmour, Indian-Owned Land Condemned, supra note 343, at Cl.
354. Order of Judgment, 1.43 Acres of Land, (No. 09-01-C-0665).
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Interview with Steven McCullough, Attorney for Cass County Joint Water Resource
District, Shareholder, Ohnstad-Twichell, P.C., in West Fargo, N.D. (Oct. 14, 2003).
358. Id. (citing Amy L. Ollendorf, Ph.D., P.G., R.P.A., Director, Cultural Resources
Management, in Testing and Evaluation of 32CS0046, Cass County, North Dakota,
ARCHAEOLOGIST'S REPORT, (Sept. 2003) (Peterson Environmental Consulting, Inc.)).
359. Dave Kolpack, Cass County Dam Still Being Debated, FORUM (Fargo), July 6, 2003, at
A17.
360. Interview with McCullough, supra note 357 (quoting Ollendorf, supra note 358).
361. Id. (quoting Ollendorf, supra note 358).
362. Id. (quoting Ollendorf, supra note 358).
363. Id. (quoting Ollendorf, supra note 358).
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D. THE RIPPLE EFFECT
In this decision, the North Dakota Supreme Court ruled that Indian land
that was not in trust can be condemned by the state, even if the Indian land
contained tribal cultural burial grounds. 364 The court continued to keep the
window narrow for when the Nonintercourse Act could be used as a defense
to protect tribal lands. 365 The Yakima tax decision was expanded to en-
compass condemnation actions against tribal property. 366 It will be pre-
cedent for North Dakota law and secondary authority for law in other states
until the United States Supreme Court rules differently, which given its
history, is unlikely. 367
The outcome of this case could be significant because it provides some
indication of the extent to which courts will allow Indian tribes to use
innovative techniques to overcome adverse effects of the allotment
program.368 The trend in Indian law jurisprudence is alarming Indian law
scholars, and 1.43 Acres of Land exacerbated their alarm.369 The High
Country News reported that the North Dakota Supreme Court "disregarded"
the Nonintercourse Act, "which protects Indian tribes from state govern-
ment," when it determined the state could take land belonging to the Tribe
to construct a dam for flood control because the state had jurisdiction over
all land in North Dakota.370 The article reported that the implication of the
decision, holding that Indian land off the reservation was just like any other
private property, could "reverberate across Indian country due in part to the
364. Cass County Water Res. Dist. v. 1.43 Acres of Land, 2002 ND 83, T 39, 643 N.W.2d
643,699.
365. Id. 33, 643 N.W.2d at 697.
366. Id.
367. See Shepard, supra note 120, at 344-45 (citing statistics of the Rehnquist Court
decisions); see also NICHOLS, supra note 42, at Capacity to Condemn, § 3.01 (citing 1.43 Acres of
Land to represent the principle that eminent domain is an inherent attribute of sovereignty and
does not depend upon a constitutional grant of power); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS
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(A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY, Aug. 22-24, 2002), WL SHOI8 ALI-ABAI (citing 1.43 Acres
of Land to show that neither a Tribe's sovereign immunity nor the Federal Nonintercourse Act
could preclude an in rem condemnation action brought by the state).
368. Worthen, supra note 208, at 316.
369. Shepard, supra note 120, at 360 (quoting Jon Waldman, N.D. Court Ruling Rescinds
Tribal Authority, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Aug. 5, 2002, at http://www.hcn.org/servlets/
hcn.Article?article id= 13350).
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fact that the land affected by the dam contains numerous tribal burial
sites." 371
As United States Indian Policy continues to have competing goals of
autonomy and assimilation, the law will continually be redefined.3 72 Now,
as the pendulum is swinging back toward assimilation, it appears more
Indian property and rights will again be lost, without having yet restored the
damage from the prior period. 373 It can be argued that the federal govern-
ment certainly has not been performing its fiduciary duties as a trustee to
the best of its ability, perhaps having a conflict of interest itself.374
The Nonintercourse Act has been held to protect fewer and fewer
situations of Indian property rights as the distinction is made between fee
land and trust land, even regarding land that is located within the reser-
vation's boundaries. 375 State courts have been given increasingly greater
jurisdiction over tribes, which began with allowing taxation of Indian
land,376 then spread to tax condemnation and forfeiture proceedings, 377 and
now includes eminent domain condemnation actions. 378 The United States
Supreme Court still has not addressed the issue directly, yet when it does,
given its history toward Indian affairs, it is not likely to rule in favor of the
tribes.379
The North Dakota Supreme Court could only reach this decision under
the facts presented in the case.380 The original landowner, Roger Shea, had
been in opposition to the dam for years. 381 Just as it appeared the Corps
would approve the permit, he sold a small piece of land within the project
371. Id. at 360 (quoting Jon Waldman, N.D. Court Ruling Rescinds Tribal Authority, HIGH
COUNTRY NEwS, Aug. 5, 2002 at http://www.hcn.org/servlets/hcn.Article?
articleid= 13350).
372. Wilkinson, supra note 91, at 30.
373. See Royster, supra note 100, at 6 (discussing how the court undercuts the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of the Indian nations by deciding cases in accord with the discredited
policies of allotment and assimilation).
374. See generally Shepard, supra note 120, at 345-46 (discussing federal courts' aggressive
actions to increase state jurisdiction).
375. Cass County v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S. 103, 115 (1998);
Lummi Indian Tribe v. Whatcom County, 5 F.3d 1355, 1359 (9th Cit. 1993); Bay Mills Indian
Cmty. v. State, 626 N.W.2d 169, 174 (Mich. App. 2001); Anderson & Middleton Lumber Co. v.
Quinault Indian Nation, 929 P.2d 379, 388 (Wash. 1996).
376. Leech Lake, 524 U.S. 103, 115 (1998); County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and
Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 270 (1992).
377. Bay Mills, 626 N.W.2d at 174.
378. Cass County Joint Water Res. Dist. v. 1.43 Acres of Land, 2002 ND 83, J 33, 643
N.W.2d 685, 698.
379. Shepard, supra note 120, at 344-45.
380. 1.43 Acres of Land, 5 33, 643 N.W.2d at 698.
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area. 38 2 The tribe that purchased the land had its reservation almost two
hundred miles from this site, and the land had never been a part of the
Tribe's homeland or reservation area. 38 3 In addition, the land at issue had
never even been allotted land; it had been privately owned by a family for
one hundred years, and owned by the railroad prior to that.384 However,
this precedent will be used in other situations with a wide variety of factual
circumstances that may not be so clear cut.
V. CONCLUSION
The North Dakota Supreme Court decided, in what it described as an
issue of first impression nationally, whether a state may condemn land
within its boundaries that has been purchased in fee by an Indian tribe but
was not reservation land, aboriginal land, allotted land, or trust land.385 The
court acknowledged that the issue involved competing claims of sover-
eignty but held that since the action was purely in rem, the Tribe's
sovereign status was of no consequence. 386 It ruled that states may exercise
broader jurisdiction over tribal lands when it is a proceeding in rem. 387 In
accordance with the reasoning in Yakima, which was also followed by
several subsequent tax cases, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that the
protection and restraints of the Nonintercourse Act did not attach to pro-
perty an Indian tribe had purchased in fee from a private landowner.388
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